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The virtues are by no means a new topic 
in moral and character education—an 
understatement to be sure. Indeed the topic 
moral virtue and more recently, intellectual 
virtue, continues to interest scholars in many 
disciplines. Much of this renewed interest can be 
traced back to Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1957) 
seminal article, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 
wherein she urges a break from Kantian and 
Utilitarian ethics, and a return to classical Greek 
moral theory rooted in virtue. Shortly thereafter 
the philosophical field of virtue ethics was born. 
A few decades later, responding to an intractable 
epistemological conundrum put forth by 
Edmond Gettier (1963), Ernest Sosa (1980) 
published a now classic article entitled, “The 
Raft and Pyramid: Coherence versus 
Foundationalism.” Therein he levied his 
considerable philosophical prowess to put forth 
a new approach to epistemology—one 
employing virtue as a powerful epistemological 
concept. Others found his approach appealing, 
and soon scholars like Loraine Code (1987), 
James Montmarquet (1993), and Linda 
Zagzebski (1996) were discovering novel ways 
to understand the relationship between belief 
formation and intellectual virtue. This 
movement, now called virtue epistemology, 
occupies a central place in the canon of 
contemporary work in the theory of knowledge.  
What is striking in both cases—virtue 
ethics and virtue epistemology—is how versatile 
and powerful the concepts of moral and 
intellectual virtue are. This prompted three 
questions: (1) how do other cultures understand 
virtue; (2) to what extent do these conceptions 
converge and diverge; and (3) to what extent 
will multiple conceptions of virtue result in 
incommensurability? Christopher Peterson and 
Martin E. P. Seligman (2004) faced similar 
worries during the early stages of their large-
scale empirical and philosophically grounded 
study of virtue in multiple cultural contexts. 
They too confronted the possibility that virtues 
are incommensurate across cultural lines: 
When we undertook our project, we 
started by creating our own list. With 
little modesty, we asserted that our list 
included strengths and virtues valued in 
all contemporary cultures around the 
world. But when we showed our list to 
colleagues, we encountered the frequent 
objection that there are no strengths and 
virtues valued across all cultures. 
Indeed, we were told that the subcultural 
variations along regional, 
socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic 
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lines in just the contemporary United 
States precluded a universal list even for 
the here and now. We took these 
criticisms seriously and worried about 
reifying characteristics valued only at 
the turn of the new century by upper-
middle-class European American 
academics (p. 33). 
It is fair to assume, I believe, that many scholars 
of comparative education will express similar 
uncertainties about this project. After all, we live 
in the age of postmodernity—an age that casts 
doubt on the project of categorization. As such, I 
have undertaken this project with great caution 
and intellectual humility. 
This aim of this paper is to explore the 
concept of intellectual and moral virtue across 
cultural, religious, and philosophical points of 
view—with special attention to the role of 
education in the formation of virtue. The central 
ambition of this paper is to determine if virtue is 
a concept that transcends cultural contexts and, 
should it do so, to what extent? Notably, the 
perspectives I cover are deeply complex, and 
only cursory coverage can be given of each. For 
the sake of clarity, then, when speaking of the 
Yoruba and Akan peoples, I am largely 
concerned with role of virtue in their cultural 
practices; my discussion of Confucianism and 
Buddhism draws mainly from religious texts and 
practices, and Greek notions of virtue 
(unsurprisingly) are drawn largely from 
philosophical sources. It is shown that certain 
ubiquitous virtuous character traits are valued 
across cultural lines, and that similar 
understandings of virtue emerge in almost all 
cultural and religious contexts. Despite this, it 
also clear that virtue functions differently across 
cultural and religious contexts, and that the 
expression of virtue may itself look very 
different.  This is demonstrated through various 
religious texts, works of philosophy, and 
traditional proverbs from several very important 
traditions: Chinese, South Asian, Greek 
philosophy, and African moral theory. I 
conclude with a discussion of challenges facing 
virtue-based theories.  
 
Virtue in Cultural Context 
According to Ninian Smart (1999), three 
world regions have been particularly influential 
in the history of religion and ideas—China 
(Taoism and Confucianism), South Asia 
(Buddhism and Hinduism), and the West (Greek 
philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) (p. 
2). I follow Smart’s lead, but add African culture 
because of its historical and cultural richness. I 
survey how virtues are understood and function 
within several of these philosophical and 
religious traditions. This discussion, while 
regrettably brief, provides sufficient ground for 
making some general observations. 
Chinese Virtue – Confucianism 
Confucianism was conceived against a 
backdrop of political turmoil. The Zhou Dynasty 
(1040? – 256 B. C. E.) had recently disintegrated 
and the king’s authority was severely 
diminished. What power remained was 
concentrated in the hands of a number of 
dukedoms that imposed their own taxes, raised 
their own armies, and often waged war on each 
other—and people suffered. Bryan W. Van 
Norden (2007) offers the following intriguing 
quote from a leading minister of Jin: 
Our ruler has here 4,000 chariots of war. 
Even if he acts contrary to the Way, it is 
still necessary to fear him; if he, beyond 
that, is acting in accordance with the 
Way, who can prove his opponent? An 
ox may be meager; but if it fall upon a 
pig, would you not fear the pig would 
die? … If we lead on the multitudes of 
Jin, using also the forces of the other 
states? … if we come thus to punish Lu 
for its offenses … what can we seek that 
we shall not get (p. 33)? 
Although the minister was cognizant of the Way 
(Dao)—the principles that govern the meditative 
life—other concerns clearly trumped it. In fact, 
brute reality showed that leaders depended more 
upon force and cunning strategy for prosperity 
than adherence to the Way. This sort of thinking 
was out of tune with the general regard ordinary 
people had for the Way. These person looked to 






power and success based on their possession of 
dé (virtue) and their respect of the Way. This 
bifurcation generated deep social tension.  
It was this chaos into which Confucius 
was born. The son of a once prosperous family, 
he made the study and teaching of the old 
traditions his life’s work. Needless to say, his 
teaching took root. Confucianism is undoubtedly 
the most instrumental system of thought to 
emerge from China. According to Norden 
(2007), Confucius “provided the intellectual 
background against which all later thinkers 
react, and he started a movement that continues 
to be socially and philosophically influential 
more than two thousand years later” (p. 65). 
Confucianism’s influence soon spread out across 
East Asian and eventually spanned continents. 
However, Confucianism is a misleading term. 
Confucius did not “invent” a brand new religion 
or system of thought. Rather he expanded on a 
centuries-old Chinese tradition. Xinzhong Yao 
(2000) explains: 
It is true that as a distinctive ‘school’ 
Confucianism began with Confucius. It 
was Confucius who explored deeply and 
elaborated extensively on the basic 
principles of what was to become 
Confucianism, and it was Confucius and 
his disciples who succeeded in 
transmitting and trans- forming their 
ancient culture. But it would go too far 
to suggest that Confucianism was 
‘created’ solely by Confucius and 
Confucianism was sustained exclusively 
by the faith in Confucius. In this sense, 
the word ‘Confucianism’ is a misnomer 
for the tradition that is normally referred 
to as ru jia, ru jiao, ru xue or simply as 
ru in China and other East Asian 
countries (p. 17). 
Nevertheless, Confucius’ role was crucial. In 
virtue of clearly articulating the central tenets of 
ru, and doing so in a compelling and clear way, 
Confucius revitalized the tradition. What, then, 
did he have to say? 
Confucius was primarily concerned with 
humans and the principles that shaped humanity. 
In particular, he believed that healthy social 
relationships were essential for a prosperous 
society. To this end, he advanced two especially 
important theses: Persons can teach and learn 
goodness, and a peaceful society is only possible 
when it is ruled by wisdom (Yao, 2000, p. 26). 
From these theses, Confucius eventually 
developed his four key ideas—those that would 
eventually become the foundation for the 
Confucian tradition. First, Confucius continued 
to promote dao, which literally translates as 
“path,” “road,” or “way.” Following dao was the 
basis for moral and peaceful social conditions. 
Second, Confucius promoted rituals (li), which 
were thought to be instrumental for the 
cultivation of virtue, and a means of educating 
persons in the ways of ru. Third, he stressed the 
importance of humaneness (ren). Those who 
practiced ren would demonstrate a concern for 
the wellbeing of others and an avoidance of self-
aggrandizement. And, fourth, Confucius 
promoted general virtue (dé). Confucian virtue 
was understood as a deeply held moral authority 
that granted persons power to act righteously. 
Confucius was especially concerned with the 
cultivation of dé among the aristocracy who 
were ultimately responsible for the prosperity of 
society (Yao, p. 26).  Taken together these four 
components roughly describe the tenets of 
Confucianism. Of course, generations of 
scholars and religious leaders have expanded 
and transformed classical Confucianism. In the 
following section, I focus largely on primary 
sources—the works of Confucius themselves 
and the five virtues they advance. 
The central virtue and one of the guiding 
principles for Confucius is ren. Ren functions as 
a kind of moral attitude and is comprised of 
various “building block” virtues. When these 
blocks are fitted together a person will display 
what Confucius calls “humanity.” This is 
compassionate humanity (a concerned regard for 
the dignity of humans) and is central to the 
Confucius’ social philosophy. The person who 
possesses ren is "a man [sic] who is strong, 
resolute, simple, and slow to speak is near to 
humanity" (Confucius, 2010, bk. 1 chap. 14). He 
seems to suggest that rashness and 
loquaciousness impede one’s ability to 
understand the human condition. As noted, 





however, ren is made up of several other virtues 
(dé). These are described in the analects: 
Zizhang asked about ren. The Master 
aid, “He who can enact five things in the 
world is ren.” When asked for details, he 
went on, “Reverence, tolerance, 
trustworthiness, quickness, and 
generosity. He is reverent, hence he 
receives no insults; he is tolerant, hence 
he gains the multitudes; he is 
trustworthy, hence others entrust him 
with responsibilities; he is quick, hence 
he has accomplishments; he is generous, 
hence he is capable of being placed in 
charge of others (Confucius, 2010, bk. 
17 chap. 6). 
These virtues work together and are dependent 
on each other. One’s generosity should be 
characterized by earnestness; one’s truthfulness 
prompts diligence, and so forth. Confucius never 
talks about the virtues in isolation. Virtue 
epistemologists have noted this interrelationship 
between virtues although the issue is a “thorny” 
one (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 156). Finally, 
according to Lee Rainey (2010), the moral 
virtues (dé) culminating in (ren) are expressed 
via ritual (li) (pp. 34-35). In fact, the cultivation 
of virtue is directly tied to ritual and education. 
Education: The Cultivation of Virtue 
through Ritual and Self-Reflection 
 
Confucians believe that virtues are 
acquired through cultivation and education, 
and/or some mixture of both. “Its chief aim is to 
educate the learner to be fully human and to 
become a qualified member of the community of 
trust, and its primary approach is to enhance 
self-cultivation and develop students’ 
capabilities of fulfilling their responsibilities for 
themselves, for their families and for society at 
large” (Yao, 2000, p. 283). The goal of 
Confucian education (which is true of many 
cultures) is ultimately tied to the social 
prosperity of the community. Confucius (2010) 
writes, “Cultivate yourself to bring comfort to 
the people” (bk. 14, chap. 42). Learning begins 
with oneself but extends to others. He takes this 
one step forward, arguing that a love of learning 
is requisite for many of the virtues. 
If, you love ren, but you do not love 
learning, the flaw is ignorance. If you 
love knowledge but you do not love 
learning, the flaw is unruliness. If you 
love faithfulness but do not love 
learning, the flaw is harming others. If 
you love straightforwardness but you do 
not love learning, the flaw is 
offensiveness. If you love valor but you 
do not love learning, the flaw is causing 
chaos. If you love incorruptibility but 
you do not love learning, the flaw is 
recklessness (Confucius, 2010, bk. 17, 
chap. 8). 
The desire to learn—that is, to take an active 
hand in acquiring new understanding—plays an 
important role for Confucius. Students who train 
their minds have the tools available to achieve 
positive ethical outcomes; they have the 
necessary know-how and know-that to exercise 
virtue. Moreover, learning itself refines and 
strengthens these virtues. Without learning, 
however, the impulse to behave virtuously may 
never obtain or (worse still) may result in 
vicious behavior. There is another important 
point to be made: “love of knowledge” is also an 
intellectual virtue—one that plays a very 
important role in the acquisition of knowledge 
and understanding. Robert C. Roberts and W. 
Jay Wood (2007), for example, argue that the 
love of knowledge is a central epistemic virtue. 
Those who love knowledge are prone toward 
fact checking, persistence, and open-
mindedness. In short, those who love learning 
also love knowledge (pp. 153-182). 
Finally, I wish to note a few important 
features of traditional Confucian education—
features that putatively nurture the 
aforementioned virtues. Educators in the 
Confucian tradition stress deep reflection, which 
involves intense study and careful analysis of the 
subject matter. The ultimate goal of this 
educational activity—at least on the traditional 
account—is the perfection of the person. Quite 
contrary to the Christian view of “original sin” 






Confucius held that persons were fundamentally 
good. Education, then, provided a way to move 
toward this perfection. Chinese students have 
amassed a well-deserved (almost stereo typical) 
reputation for being extremely diligent and 
hardworking. This might be attributable to the 
philosophical (and educational) foundation laid 
by Confucius and his followers. The very first 
lines of the Analects illustrate how important 
study was to Confucius: “The Master said: To 
study and at due times practice what one has 
studied, is this not a pleasure?” For Confucians, 
education is a lifelong process of self-cultivation 
that emphasizes strength of will and 
determination. Timothy Bergen (1995) explains 
that Chinese emphases on “perfectibility, 
learning, rationality, effort, and will-power” are 
closely related to one another in Confucian 
literature, and that “this fact sheds light upon 
how Eastern learners view education and 
explains why effort is seen as important in the 
process of human perfectibility” (p. 45). In the 
language of virtue: Chinese educational culture 
values diligence and steadfastness with respect 
to learning. 
South Asian Virtue – Buddhism 
Buddhism is among the largest and most 
influential religions in the world. Its primary 
concentration is in the region of South Asia, 
which includes India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Burma. Leslie 
Alldritt (2005) estimates that there are 
approximately 360 million Buddhists in the 
world, making it the third largest religion in the 
world after Christianity and Islam (p. 4). It has 
been estimated that over half of the world’s 
population lives in areas significantly influenced 
by Buddhism (Harvey, 1990, p. 1). Numerous 
varieties of Buddhism exist, although three 
broad schools are dominate: the Southern variety 
where Theravada Buddhism is prevalent, the 
Eastern version which mixes Chinese religious 
tradition with Buddhism, and the Northern 
variety found in Tibetan culture—the modern 
inheritors of ancient Indian Buddhism (Harvey, 
1990, p. 4).  The following analysis draws from 
the sacred canons of each of these schools with 
the intention of providing a general account of 
Buddhist understandings of virtue. 
The founder of Buddhism, Siddhārtha 
Gautama (500? – 350? B.C.E.) was born and 
taught near the Ganges River in Northeastern 
India. However, the historical facts about his life 
remain contested. Most accounts, though, assert 
that he was born into a wealthy family and with 
the prospect of hold power. Michael Carrithers 
(1983) offers the following sketch: 
The Buddha was born the son of a king, 
and so grew up with wealth, pleasure 
and the prospect of power, all goods 
commonly desired by human beings. As 
he reached manhood, however, he was 
confronted with a sick man, an old man 
and a corpse. He had lived a sheltered 
life, and these affected him profoundly, 
for he realized that no wealth or power 
could prevent him too from 
experiencing illness, old age and death. 
He also saw a wandering ascetic, bent 
on escaping these sufferings. Reflecting 
on what he had seen, he reached the first 
great turning-point of his life: against 
the wishes of his family he renounced 
home, wife, child and position to 
become a homeless wanderer, seeking 
release from this apparently inevitable 
pain (p. 2). 
Despite Carrithers own admission that his 
account is only roughly true, it nevertheless 
explains an important feature of the Buddhist 
religion. The Buddha’s path to enlightenment 
originated in his confrontation with the existence 
of pain and suffering. Carrithers goes on to 
describe how the Buddha began his spiritual 
journey by practicing meditation and self-
mortification. These proved ineffective until one 
day he determined to quietly reflect upon the 
human plight. From this tranquil contemplation 
he achieved an awakening—solving the 
“enigma” of suffering. For the next forty-five 
years he spread his message of enlightenment, 
and a world religion was born ( p. 3). 
To grasp how Buddhists understand the 
concept virtue, it is necessary to cover the basic 
teaching of Buddhism. According to Stephen 
Laumakis (2008), the most important concept in 
all Buddhist thought is the notion that who we 





are is product of our thinking. Just as the body is 
shaped by food and exercise (or lack thereof), so 
too can we “maintain, shape, transform, and 
indeed, strengthen” our minds’ “powers by 
meditative practices and exercises” (p. 40). To 
control the mind and thus perception is the goal 
of Buddhist religious experience. Bearing this 
insight in mind, let us briefly consider the tenets 
and practices of Buddhism as manifest in the 
Middle Way, Four Noble Truths, and Eightfold 
Path.  
The Three Teachings 
The Buddha taught that a way between 
extreme asceticism and hedonism existed—what 
came to be known as the Middle Way. The 
Buddha discovered that self-denial and 
mortification produced debilitating emotional 
and physical suffering, and failed to live up to its 
promises. While, on the other hand, hedonistic 
enjoyment of life’s pleasures failed to fulfill his 
desire for peace, worldly pleasure was too 
fleeting to bring lasting joy. The Middle Way, 
however, “gives rise to vision, which gives rise 
to knowledge, which leads to peace, to direct 
knowledge, to enlightenment…” (Laumakis, 
2008, p. 47). Metaphysically, the implications of 
the Middle Way are that human souls are not 
fixed and eternal, nor are they destined for 
ultimate annihilation. Instead, they are 
annatta—lacking a fixed self (Laumakis, p. 
270). Epistemologically, the Middle Way 
suggests cautious path between naïve certainty 
and total skepticism about our beliefs.  
The Four Noble Truths capture the basic 
teachings of the Buddha and are modeled on 
Indian medical science: confirming that patient 
is sick, diagnosing the sickness, prescribing 
treatment, and implementing the cure. The 
Truths follow this pattern. The first noble truth 
simply states that dukkha (suffering and pain) 
exists—both existential and physical dukkha. 
This is the starting point of the Buddha’s 
thought. The second Noble Truth is more 
complex. It states that the causes of dukkha are 
linked in a causal chain that begins with 
“contact” with the world, others, and ourselves. 
This contact produces sensation, which in turn 
producing craving, and craving produces 
suffering when it is unrequited. The third Noble 
truth states that the cessation of these causes of 
dukkha is possible. Finally, the fourth Noble 
Truth prescribes the Way to overcome dukkha—
the Eightfold Path (Laumakis, 2008, pp. 52-60). 
The specifics of the Buddha’s Middle 
Way are laid out in the Eightfold path. These 
steps are (Olson, 2005, p. 54): 
Right View or Understanding 







The term “path” suggests that one takes 
consecutive and linear steps toward 
enlightenment. This is a misunderstanding as 
these steps occur simultaneously. Moreover, the 
word “right” indicates that one correctly 
perceives the true state of affairs or reality. 
These steps are also divisible into three main 
categories: Wisdom, Meditation, and Moral 
Action. The first category—Wisdom—indicates 
that one grasps the Four Noble Truths and their 
implications for life. “This is the greatest 
wisdom that one can achieve in this life. These 
are skillful, useful, and beneficial views. If you 
attain this wisdom, you are liberated from the 
cycle of pain and sorrow” (Olson, p. 55). 
Grasping this Wisdom recommends taking steps 
toward addressing the existence of dukkha. 
Meditation, the second category, explicates this 
massive mental struggle to free the mind of evil 
states. Controlling the mind and cultivating 
strength of will are essential because the mind 
defaults to craving and grasping for things that 
lead to suffering. The final category—Moral 
Action—involves our conduct in speech, 
behavior, and livelihood. Here Buddhists believe 
that the reduction of dukkha depends upon our 






chain of suffering. Put differently, when we 
resist repaying an evil with another evil we stop 
the chain reaction that promulgates further 
suffering. This final category gets us closer to a 
Buddhist theory of virtue. 
Buddhism and Virtue 
Three steps on the Eightfold Path deal 
explicitly with moral action. It is not surprising 
that Buddhists have written extensively on moral 
character. According to Damien Keown (2005), 
“There is more to the Buddhist moral life than 
following rules. Rules must not only be 
followed, but followed for the right reasons and 
with the correct motivation. It is here that the 
role of the virtues becomes important.” He goes 
on to claim that the precepts (rules) and virtues 
are two sides of the same coin. Precepts are 
essentially “a list of things a virtuous person 
would never do” (p. 12). Like many other 
religious traditions, Buddhist virtues are 
supposed to be habituated so that they come 
forth naturally from a person’s character. This 
corresponds with Zagzebski’s (1996) 
observations about the motivational component 
of intellectual and moral virtues—the view that 
they impel us to act and think in particular ways 
(p. 167). Likewise, the virtues counteract their 
dukkha producing opposites—klesas (what we 
call vices in the West). In other words, those 
who are virtuous are less prone toward 
generating more suffering in the world.  
Perhaps the most influential list of 
virtues was composed in the Mahayana tradition. 
In this tradition, the bodhisattva (an enlightened 
person or being) practices six core virtues—
referred to as the paramita or Six Perfections. 
These include generosity, morality, patience, 
perseverance, meditation, and insight (Keown, 
2005, p. 17). However, earlier it was noted that 
followers of the Buddha must struggle to avoid 
negative thinking. This fact directly affects the 
way that such virtues are practiced. Suppose an 
enlightened Buddhist monk decides to minister 
to the needs of homeless people. He discovers an 
alley where the homeless are living in cardboard 
boxes. They are dirty, underfed, and sickly. A 
natural human response would to be to place 
oneself in these persons shoes, and to be filled 
with despair.  
To become emotionally identified with 
her would be like a person without any 
ability to swim jumping into a lake to 
save a drowning child, which would 
result in a double drowning. It is 
necessary for a compassionate person to 
be cool-headed and emotionally self-
controlled, a posture similar to that of a 
medical doctor analyzing a patient and 
prescribing a remedy in a detached 
manner—which does not mean a cold-
hearted, uncaring way. The Buddhist 
goal is to strive for the spontaneous 
exercise of compassion (Olson, 2005, p. 
69). 
Thus the monk has learned to control his mind. 
He understands (insight) the situation and feels 
appropriate amounts of compassion and 
generosity. He also understands that his 
ministrations—while good and noble—will 
make only a small difference. And he 
perseveres; he returns to that ally each day, all 
the while refusing to succumb to dukkha.  
Education: Obtaining Virtue through the 
Five Precepts 
Virtue is taught via the Five Precepts 
that lay Buddhists are encouraged to follow in 
both the Mahayana and Theravada traditions. 
These include a respect for life, avoidance of 
theft, abstinence from sexual misconduct, 
avoidance of untruthfulness, and avoidance of 
drunkenness. The precepts “are meant to be 
followed by Buddhists at all times, the object 
being to establish a habit-formation of virtuous 
and restrained conduct, in opposition to the 
unwholesome tendencies of greed, hatred, and 
delusion….” (Story, 2009, para. 7). Living by 
these principles not only encourages self-control 
and moral behavior, but also places a person in a 
positive—habit forming—state of mind that 
affects deep change. Helmut Klar (2011) offers 
several methods for inculcating the Five 
Precepts into a child’s education. First, he notes 
that imitation (of parents and teachers) is of 
central importance. When parents take their 





dharmic responsibilities seriously, and live those 
convictions out, children will imitate them. Klar 
also encourages parents to celebrate Buddhism 
with their children. This can be done by keeping 
images of the Buddha in the home, and 
celebrating festival days. Finally, he notes the 
importance of reading and discussing Buddhist 
texts with children, especially the Five Precepts 
(pp. 2-6). Taken together, such activities are 
foundations for “learning by heart”—that is, 
fostering a deep regard and love of Buddhism 
from a very early age.  
Cultivation of virtue is integral to 
following the Middle Way of the Buddha, and 
thus assumes privileged place in Buddhist 
monastic education. Future monks are taught the 
necessity of cultivating inward virtues in both 
ritual-based education and their philosophical 
training. George B. J. Dryfuss (2003), a 
Westerner who studied in the Dalai Lama’s 
temple for 15 years, describes several ways this 
is done. First, he points out that newly arrived 
monks are immersed in rigorous ritual life. New 
monks, for example, are encouraged to recite 
texts with specific and highly precise inflection. 
This is thought to preserve textual meaning, but 
it is also thought to cultivate the virtues of 
conscientiousness and carefulness (pp. 86-87).  
If monks decide to pursue scholarship in the 
monastery, their training regimen intensifies 
significantly. They continue to memorize large 
portions of text (largely philosophical texts) but 
add to this education training in debate—the 
primary method of teaching for many monastic 
teachers. The central goal of which is to produce 
perspicuity of thought and critical reasoning 
skills. As noted earlier, however, the skills (or 
virtues) do not operate in isolation from other 
virtues. The monk, whose thoughts penetrate 
truth, is one whose character is deeply virtuous 
(Dryfuss, p. 170).  
Greek Philosophy 
Virtue has a long history in Western 
(European) thought—particularly through the 
influence of Greek philosophy and 
Christianity—and one could fill several volumes 
tracing its extensive influence. Instead, I provide 
a very rough sketch of virtue by highlighting 
some key concepts that emerge from Greek 
philosophy and contemporary virtue ethics.  
The two key concepts that preoccupied 
ancient Greek moral theory were virtue (arête) 
and happiness (eudaimonia). Prior to Plato and 
Aristotle, however, the two concepts were nearly 
synonymous. “[Virtue] amounts, roughly, to 
success in life, where such success is measured 
largely if not entirely in external terms—in the 
extent to which one has acquired the typically 
recognized good things in life: wealth, power, 
friends, and the like” (Meyer, 2008, pp. 3-4). 
The distinction between virtue and happiness on 
this account is blurry. Virtue is understood 
almost exclusively by its external manifestation, 
e.g., one is virtuous when one is obviously 
successful. In Plato and Aristotle, however, 
virtue is redefined as an internal characteristic or 
trait (Meyer, p. 4). One might act courageously, 
for example, but one is courageous only insofar 
as courage is a deeply engrained character trait.  
Aristotle is probably the most influential 
Greek philosopher to articulate a concept of 
virtue. He begins by noting that our actions 
generally have a goal (telos)—a reason for 
having done them. “Every skill and every 
inquiry, and similarly every action and rational 
choice, is thought to aim at some good” 
(Aristotle, 2004, p. 3). Indeed, if our actions 
lacked some sort of goal they would be 
essentially meaningless. Aristotle also 
distinguishes between to forms of tele: there are 
goals that facilitate achieving other goals, and 
there are goals that we pursue for their own 
sake. Consider the act of making cookies. There 
are a whole series of steps I must take in order to 
make (and eat) a batch of cookies. I have to run 
to the market and purchase the ingredients, 
prepare the batter, kneed the dough, pre-heat the 
oven, and so forth. Each of these steps is a 
telos—but each points toward a greater telos: to 
enjoy a batch of fresh cookies. This greater 
telos—enjoying cookies—explains the steps I 
took along the way. “The ubiquitous human 
phenomenon of doing things for reasons, 
therefore, depends on there being at least one 
thing we pursue for its own sake” (Meyer, 2008, 
p. 52). Of course, there are many things we 






children, prosperity, pleasure, and so on. But, as 
Aristotle notes, “we choose them also for the 
sake of happiness, on the assumption that 
through them we shall live a life of happiness; 
whereas happiness no one chooses for the sake 
of any of these nor indeed for the sake of 
anything else” (p. 3). In short, for Aristotle 
happiness is the ultimate good and the telos for 
which we should all strive. 
What role do virtues like courage, 
honesty, and practical wisdom play in the 
acquisition of happiness? To address this 
question, two points need to be clarified. First, 
Aristotle tells us that our basic function—that 
which makes us distinctly human—is our 
capacity to reason. Roger Crisp (2004) offers an 
interesting and helpful analogy. “It is worth 
remembering that in Greek a horse that ran fast 
could be said to have a ‘virtue’ or excellence, in 
so far as it performed well its characteristic 
activity” (p. xiv). A horse has a virtue when it 
performs well in one of its basic functions. 
Many take Aristotle to be endorsing what has 
come to be known as the “function argument, 
which takes the following form (Meyer, 2008, p. 
63):  
1. Happiness is “doing well.”  
2. Doing well means performing our 
human function well. 
3. Our human function is reasoning. 
4. Therefore, happiness consists in 
using our reason well. 
5. Therefore, happiness is activity of 
excellence of reason. 
When persons reason well—the basic function—
they do so because they exercise virtue. Nafsika 
Athanassoulis (2011) elaborates: “If the function 
of man [sic] is reason, then the good man is the 
man who reasons well. This is the life of 
excellence or of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the 
life of virtue—activity in accordance with 
reason, man’s highest function” (para. 32).Thus 
happiness is the byproduct of reasoning well—
of virtuous reasoning. This leads to a second 
consideration. 
Second, the nature of reason is tied to 
Aristotle’s understanding of the bipartite soul. 
Briefly, the soul is divisible into rational and 
non-rational parts (Aristotle, 2004, pp. 103-104). 
The rational segment is the source of the 
intellectual virtues—the chief of which is 
practical wisdom. It is less obvious how the non-
rational part of the soul relates to reason. Once 
more a division is created—this time into a part 
concerned with things like nutrition, but also a 
part that has “more in common with reason, and 
is capable both of opposing it (in the case of a 
weak- willed person, for instance) and of 
obeying it. The virtues of this second sub-part 
are the virtues of character: courage, generosity, 
and so on” (Crisp, 2004, p. xiv). Thus, excellent 
(virtuous) reasoning is tied to both virtues of 
character and intellectual virtues. As a 
consequence, those who are morally and 
intellectually virtuous experience eudaimonia. 
Education: Cultivating Virtue through 
Education and Habituation 
How, then, are the (moral and 
intellectual) virtues acquired? In the first place, 
Aristotle (2004) thinks they are acquired through 
different and separate means: “intellectual virtue 
owes its origin and development mainly to 
teaching, for which reason its attainment 
requires experience and time; virtue of character 
(ēthos) is a result of habituation (ethos), for 
which reason it has acquired its name through a 
small variation on ‘ethos’” (p. 23). Thus 
Aristotle’s virtues are acquired in two ways—
through teaching (intellectual virtues) and 
habituation (moral virtues). Let us consider 
intellectual virtues first.  
Aristotle distinguishes between two 
kinds of intellectual virtue: the contemplative 
and the calculative. According to Dunne (1999), 
contemplative virtues are learned deductively—
that is, one starts with the general and moves 
toward the specific (pp. 49-63).  These virtues 
include episteme (scientific knowledge), nous 
(intuitive reason), and Sophia (philosophical 
wisdom). Episteme or “scientific knowledge” 
provides a good example. One can (putatively) 
only acquire this virtue deductively—that is, by 
listening to descriptions, considering 





explanations, and studying the arguments of 
one’s instructors. The upshot is that it is 
acquired through teaching, not habituation. The 
calculative virtues, on the other hand, are more 
difficult to restrict to the result of teaching alone. 
In brief, the calculative virtues include phronesis 
(practical wisdom) and techne (skill). These 
virtues “enable one to attain ‘variable’ 
(contingent) truths that are ‘in agreement with 
right desire’” (Battaly, 2006, p. 202). Moreover, 
each is acquire via inductive and deductive 
teaching. Practical wisdom, for example, is 
obtained through listening and considering 
lectures about “what is noble and just” 
(Aristotle, 2004, p. 6). Thus one learns practical 
wisdom via deduction. But induction is also 
important. This entails learning through 
practice—e.g., practice adjudicating and 
considering particulars—which begins to look 
very similar to habituation. I consider this point 
in more depth in the following chapter. 
The moral virtues, as noted above, are 
acquired through habituation. “We become 
builders by building, and lyre-players by playing 
the lyre. So too we become just by doing just 
actions, temperate by temperate actions, and 
courageous by courageous actions” (Aristotle, 
2004, p. 23).  In short, we become virtuous by 
practicing virtue, which has the clear 
implication that the moral upbringing of students 
cannot be taught by instruction alone. It requires 
that children consistently practice virtuous acts 
thereby acquiring truly virtuous character traits. 
The matter is complicated, however, by 
Aristotle’s claim that one cannot become truly 
morally virtuous without the presence of the 
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.  
It is clear from what we have said, then, 
that we cannot be really good without 
practical wisdom, or practically wise 
without virtue of character. Moreover, 
on these lines one might also meet the 
dialectical argument that could be used 
to suggest that the virtues exist in 
isolation from one another. The same 
person, it might be argued, is not best 
suited by nature for all the virtues, so 
that he will already have acquired one 
before he has acquired another. This is 
possible in respect of the natural virtues, 
but not in respect of those on the basis 
of which a person is said to be really 
good; for he will possess all of them as 
soon as he acquires the one, practical 
wisdom (p. 118). 
This is because the complexities of life often 
demand we discern a how to act properly. This 
interdependence of intellectual and moral virtues 
is at the heart of Aristotle’s argument for the 
unity of the virtues.  
African Concepts of Virtue 
There is a vibrant philosophical 
community on the African continent. For 
example, in A Companion to African 
Philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu (2004) assembles an 
impressively diverse collection of essays 
addressing topics like the philosophy of mind, 
history of African philosophy, logic, and moral 
philosophy—all from a distinctly African 
perspective. But what is African philosophy? 
Somewhat simplified, there are presently two 
general perspectives on African philosophy—the 
traditional and the anti-ethnophilosophical. 
According to Wiredu, “Traditionalists have 
tended…to restrict the concerns of modern 
African philosophy to issues having some 
connection with traditional African thought and 
culture.” On the other hand, the anti-
ethnophilosophers argue that “the modern world 
presents intellectual challenges which may not 
all admit of such a derivation, and to abstain 
from involvement with them on the grounds of a 
non-African origination is unlikely to prove a 
blessing to Africa in the modern world” (p. 4). 
The division, then, centers on the role of 
Western thought. This issue extends beyond the 
concerns of this chapter. I would note, however, 
that the notion of virtue advanced here draws 
from traditional African philosophy.  
It is also worth noting that the term 
African Philosophy is equivalent to using the 
term Western philosophy; each encompasses 
innumerable philosophical perspectives shaded 
by a larger cultural milieu. Sensitive to this, I 
have tried to restrict my generalizations to those 






good reason for this. Africa is in the midst of 
crisis of self-determination—the consequence of 
having been aggressively colonized for 
centuries. It is for those whose lives are tied to 
the African continent, whose futures are 
(literally) at stake, to generalize about the nature 
of that future and self-identity.  
Foundations for Moral Thought in Africa 
In most African cultures, the foundation 
of ethics is twofold: a respect for the individual 
appropriately balanced with the needs of the 
community. But this is a tenuous balance as 
Segun Gbadegesin (1991) notes: 
From this it follows that there need not 
be any tension between individuality 
and community since it is possible for 
an individual to freely give up his/her 
own perceived interest for the survival 
of the community. But in giving up 
one’s interests thus, one is also sure that 
the community will not disown one and 
that one’s well being will be its 
concern…. The idea of individual rights, 
based on a conception of individuals as 
atoms, is therefore bound to be foreign 
to this system. For community is 
founded on notions of an intrinsic and 
enduring relationship among its 
members (pp. 66-67). 
To understand the virtues, one first needs to 
grasp the interdependent relationship between 
the individual and the community, and the 
mutual demands engendered by this relationship. 
Gbadegesin uses the term survival quite 
deliberately; many African communities have 
extremely limited access to natural resources. 
The individual that fails to grasp her obligations 
to community risk expulsion. What, then, is the 
character of this bond between the person and 
her community? Traditionally, this connection 
has been understood as fundamentally rooted in 
religion—that is, that the basis for morality is 
inextricably tied to the deeply religious nature of 
African culture. Several notable African scholars 
have propagated this view, including Bolaji 
Idowu, John Mbiti, and J. O. Awolala. 
Unfortunately, this view also misses an 
important point: “These authors fail to 
understand what makes religion important in 
African life, namely, the welfare of the 
individual and that of society” (Bewaji, 2004, p. 
397). African people are not—in the pejorative 
sense—so deeply religious as to have no regard 
for human welfare outside of religious systems 
of thought. Indeed, religion serves as a means of 
discharging their responsibilities to maintain 
human welfare. Devotion and worship of deities 
is performed genuinely, but not for the sake of 
the deity. Rather religious worship is offered for 
the benefit of society. When a deity fails to serve 
(or bless) the interests of the society, people are 
free to sever that relationship (Bewaji, p. 399). 
In short, African people value human life for its 
own sake—not as the product of blind 
religiosity.  
African Virtue 
Bearing these contextualizing remarks 
in mind, we can now turn our attention to 
African notions of virtue. Kwame Gyekye 
(2011) notes, “Good character is the essence of 
the African moral system, the linchpin of the 
moral wheel” (section. 1). Indeed, he also claims 
that:  
Many writers have made the observation 
that despite the indisputable cultural 
diversity that arises from Africa's ethnic 
pluralism, there are underlying affinities 
in many areas of the African life; this is 
surely true in the African religious and 
moral outlook. There are some features 
of the moral life and thought of various 
African societies that…are common or 
shared features (section. 2). 
Following Gyekye’s assertion that “good 
character” is the basis for moral reasoning in 
African society, I examine the two largest ethnic 
populations in Western Africa—the Yoruba and 
Akan people.  
Bewaji notes that the Yoruba hold to a 
set of pervasive ethical norms that regulate the 
behavior of both persons and the gods. Those 
who live uprightly—whose character exhibit 
virtue with respect to themselves, tribal elders, 
and others in general are variously called oniwa 





rere, oniwa tutu, and Omoluwabi (Bewaji, 2004, 
399). These terms denote persons that are 
esteemed in their respective societies for their 
virtuous character. Bolatito Lanre-Abass (2008) 
highlights six core virtues in Yoruba society. 
These include integrity (iwa), justice (iwa eto), 
trust (igbagbo), accountability (akoyawo), 
sensitivity (iyara ni imo), and service (ise 
iranse) (p. 132). The importance of cultivating 
such virtues is caught up in the Yoruba proverb, 
“The adornment of a smile is white teeth; the 
adornment of a person is good character” 
(Owomoyela, 2005, p. 268). Such proverbs are 
illustrative: they succinctly encapsulate the 
rooted cultural wisdom about the importance of 
virtue. As noted above, Africa societies 
emphasize the individual’s responsibility to the 
community and vice versa; the Yoruba are no 
different. The good or virtuous community 
member values and speaks highly of her town. 
“Whoever says the town is not pleasant should 
pack his or her luggage and head for the bush” 
(Owomoyela, p. 314). Indeed, numerous 
proverbs recommend that loyal community 
members should be recognized and rewarded for 
their faithfulness to community.  
The Akan people of Western Africa 
echo similar sentiments. “When virtue founds a 
town, the town thrives and abides.” The Akan 
link the success of a town to its character—or 
rather, the character of its people. This reiterates 
the social nature of African moral thought and 
central place of character. Indeed, individual 
happiness is only achieved when one is in right 
standing with his fellows: “The well-being of 
man depends on his fellow man” (Gyekye, 2011, 
section 8). Among the several virtues valued by 
the Akan are goodwill, sympathy, compassion, 
and altruism. But this raises another question: 
How are the virtues acquired or learned?  
Education: Personhood and the Acquisition 
of Virtuous Character 
Becoming virtuous is an ongoing 
process social education in which persons 
continually evolve. In fact, the relationship 
between character and education is the basis for 
understanding personhood in African thought. 
Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) explains: 
The various societies found in 
traditional Africa routinely accept this 
fact that personhood is the sort of thing 
which has to be attained, and is attained 
in direct proportion as one participates 
in communal life through the discharge 
of the various obligations defined by 
one's stations. It is the carrying out of 
these obligations that transforms one 
from the it-status of early child-hood, 
marked by an absence of moral 
function, into the person-status of later 
years, marked by a widened maturity of 
ethical sense—an ethical maturity 
without which personhood is conceived 
as eluding one (p. 176). 
According to Menkiti we begin our life-journey 
with it-status—that is, without a secure identity. 
Over time, however, through responsible 
participation in the life of the community we 
obtain person-status. D. A. Masolo (2004) 
argues that personhood is actually “attained 
through an educational process that intensifies at 
every stage in one’s growth and development” 
(p. 491). He offers the example of message 
carrying. Children in many African communities 
are tasked with carrying message from one 
person to another. While seemingly innocuous, 
such task are designed to train children “in the 
virtue of obedience and serve to others while 
also bring them to the knowledge of close and 
distant relatives, an obvious attempt to fit 
children into the larger social system…” 
(Masolo, p. 492). As children mature into 
adolescence and then to adulthood, their social 
obligations increase (as does their status as 
persons). Ideally, their character develops in 
similar proportion. Of course, both good and bad 
character traits may emerge. One Akan proverb 
states that “one is not born with a bad head, but 
one takes it on from the earth” (Gyekye, 2011, 
section 3). In short, persons are not born with 
intrinsic character traits and habits, but obtain 









Some Points of Contact and Divergence 
It goes without saying that the 
intellectual traditions discussed are radically 
different in many ways: their religions, cultural 
customs and traditions, even their moral 
practices and laws. Certain Asian cultures, for 
example, believe it is perfectly ordinary and 
unproblematic to give monetary gifts to potential 
clients in order to gain their business. In the 
United States such practices are illegal. 
Likewise, the sacrifice of animals is an act of 
worship for many cultures, but a cause for horror 
in many European cultures. This highlights the 
fact that, although two cultures may value 
similar virtues, the manner in which these 
virtues shape customs and practices leaves a lot 
of room for difference. Let us consider some of 
these similarities and differences. 
The Confucian notion of Ren—the sum 
total of virtues leading to compassion—is a 
crucial component of Confucian ethics. Both 
Buddhist and African traditions also have place 
great emphasis on an empathetic stance toward 
others. Indeed, the stability of African 
communities hinges on a concern for the 
wellbeing of other members of the community. 
Although Aristotle was primarily concerned 
with individual happiness, he also believed that 
those who were virtuous would display attitudes 
of friendliness, generosity, and justice.  
Buddhism’s emphasis on enlightenment 
is founded on controlling and modifying one’s 
cognitive life. A similar thrust is evident in 
Confucianism’s emphasis on the importance of 
education. Recall that Confucius (2010) believed 
a love of knowledge central to the acquisition of 
virtue. In fact, he believed that one would 
become vicious without knowledge (bk 14, 
chap. 42). This partially explains why both 
traditions emphasize diligence and hard work 
with respect to learning. Aristotle also stressed 
the importance of the cognitive life, believing 
that our most basic function is reason. Those 
who reason well embody the virtues. They also 
experience happiness and Aristotle (2004) tells 
us “happiness, therefore, will be some form of 
contemplation” (p. 198). 
With respect to the virtues of character, 
Aristotle argued that they are obtained through 
habituation and practice. This insight is echoed 
in African moral thought. Children are given 
multi-layered tasks that develop character, and 
initiate them into to the larger community. The 
latter is intended to cultivate a concern for the 
wellbeing of the community at large. This is a 
form of habituation, or learning by practice and 
repetition, and a feature that African societies 
share with the other traditions discussed. The 
rigorous memory training undergone by 
Buddhist monks, for example, teaches diligence, 
conscientiousness and carefulness (recall, they 
must inflect perfectly). Furthermore, 
Confucians, Buddhists, and Aristotelians share a 
regard for rules and/or precepts. These do not 
replace the cultivation of virtue. Rather, they 
provide a framework that enables persons to 
mature into virtue.  
A devotion to community is a central 
feature of many African societies. Indeed, one’s 
personhood hinges on maturing into a 
responsible (virtuous) adult. For the Yoruba this 
involves cultivating integrity, justice, 
trustworthiness, accountability, sensitivity, and 
service. These community-directed virtues are 
echoed in each of the traditions considered. This 
is evident in Confucian idea of ren—of 
becoming “near to humanity” (Confucius, 2010, 
bk 1, chap. 14). The person who has ren has a 
deep concern for other members of the 
community. Buddhists also practice community-
directed virtues. For example, the custom of 
giving is an ancient practice intended bring the 
negative craving for personal possessions under 
control, but it is also practiced for the sake of the 
wellbeing and unity of the community (Olson, 
2005, p. 104). Finally, in a passage on the virtue 
of friendship, Aristotle (2004) states clearly that 
a concern for community is tied a person’s 
honor: “The person who contributes nothing to 
the community is not honored, since what is 
common is given to the person who benefits the 
community, and honor is something common” 
(p. 163). 
Clearly positive accounts of virtue a 
present in each of the traditions considered. In 
this respect, the concept of virtue putatively 





transcends cultural “borders” and religious 
traditions. But this does not diminish the fact 
that cultures also differ in terms of the virtues. 
Martin and Seligman (2004) conducted a survey 
of 15,000 persons from numerous distinct 
cultural contexts, and undertook a large-scale 
historical survey of ancient traditions to 
determine how virtues function in multiple 
contexts. They found that, despite these 
variations, six core virtues were present in every 
cultural context:  
When data collection was complete, 
analysis involved condensing each list 
by locating thematically similar virtues 
and classifying them under an obviously 
emerging core virtue. By that term, we 
mean an abstract ideal encompassing a 
number of other, more specific virtues 
that reliably converge to the 
recognizable higher-order category (p. 
35). 
These higher-order categories included: wisdom, 
courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and 
transcendence. Twenty-four additional and more 
specific virtues were then categorized under 
each of these headings. Here there was a greater 
degree of variety between cultures. It is also 
important to note that these higher-order virtues 
did not share a one-to-one relationship across 
cultures. 
While much more research should be 
done on the topic discussed in this paper, I one 
particularly powerful observation should be 
made about cross-cultural communication. 
Virtue—or more precisely—virtuous 
communication might aid in ameliorating 
cultural misapprehensions, misunderstandings, 
and in extreme cases--xenophobia. David Carr 
(2003) has pointed out that the strength of virtue 
theories is that the language it employs cuts 
across cultural divides: 
To be sure, we can see that people from 
different parts of the world have very 
different—even contradictorily 
opposed—moral beliefs, but we are 
nevertheless able to recognize certain 
cross-cultural criteria of moral attitude 
and conduct. The Moslem [sic] 
shopkeeper down the road has different 
beliefs from me, but I am well able to 
appreciate his honesty, integrity, 
courage and industry; on the other hand, 
I may have no trouble recognizing the 
racist bigots who persecute him—albeit 
in the name of my own culture—for the 
liars and cowards that they are. It is also 
clearly important that some such cross-
cultural criteria of moral value are 
recognizable if there is to be the 
possibility of holding some cultures to 
moral account precisely for their 
injustice, mendacity, intemperateness or 
cruelty. From this viewpoint, it seems a 
mistake to index virtues to rival moral 
traditions in the manner of some recent 
neo-idealist moral and social theories—
for the language of virtue is arguably the 
cross-cultural ethical currency of 
humankind (p. 231). 
The evidence presented thus far suggests that 
Carr is correct; talk of courage, honesty, and 
justice are not foreign concepts to those of 
diverse backgrounds. Carr does not mention, 
however, that the cross-cultural “language of 
virtue” is predicated on a disposition and 
willingness to communicate. I suggest, then, that 
certain character traits are crucial if cultural 
exchange and understanding is to be achieved. 
An individual and society should be open-
minded and epistemically humble. An open-
minded person or society is receptive to other 
ideas and customs; it values and thus strives to 
understand others. In short, such persons (and 
cultures) begin with the presupposition that what 
we know and understand about other people 
groups is potentially wrong-headed, limited, or 
misguided.  
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